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JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
Whether a letter agreement which purports to create an option to purchase
subdivision lots to be developed on unimproved real property is enforceable where
(1)

the written language of the agreement lacks the total number and size of the

lots or a formula for determining such;
(2)

the written language of the agreement lacks an outside date for exercise of the

option-which exercise is conditioned upon completion of subdivision development by the
optionee;
(3)

a reasonable time has passed without completion of subdivision development;

(4)

any unilateral offer or bilateral contract to sell lots created by the agreement

and

was withdrawn or rescinded.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This matter is on appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of Roger Russell ("Russell"), Roger Richards, and Kristen Russell. On appeal, this Court
applies the same standard for summary judgment as applied by the district court and may
review the entire record to determine the correctness of the district court's conclusions of
law including conclusions that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact.
Neiderhauser Builders & Dev. Corp. v. Campbell 824 P.2d 1193, 1196 (Utah App. 1992).
In addition, the court may affirm the district court's grant of summary judgment on any
1

ground available to the district court, even if it was not relied on below. Higgins v. Salt Lake
County. 855 P.2d 231, 235 (Utah 1993).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3.
Leases and contracts for interest in lands.
Every contract for the leasing for a longer period than one year, or for
the sale, of any lands, or any interest in lands, shall be void unless the
contract, or some note or memorandum thereof, is in writing subscribed by the
party by whom the lease or sale is to be made, or by his lawful agent
thereunto authorized in writing.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Coulter & Smith, Ltd. ("Coulter") commenced this action for specific enforcement
and for damages based upon a letter agreement (the "Letter Agreement") which allegedly
created an option for the sale of subdivision lots which were to be developed on unimproved
real property owned by Russell. R. 1-52, Complaint. Russell moved for dismissal or, in the
alternative, summary judgment based on the undisputed facts which showed that any option
rights created by the Letter Agreement were void and unenforceable as a matter of law. R.
121-22, Motion for Summary Judgment. Russell's motion was granted by the district court
after hearing.

R. 469-77, Transcript.

The district court issued findings of fact and

conclusions of law and entered judgment dismissing Coulter's claims with prejudice. R. 45357, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law; R. 461-63, Amended Summary Judgment.
Coulter subsequently commenced this appeal. R. 464-65, Notice of Appeal. Russell moved
for summary disposition, which motion was deferred until further consideration. This matter
was subsequently poured over to this Court for disposition.
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STATEMENT OF UNDISPUTED FACTS
1.

In 1991, Russell and Coulter each owned or controlled undeveloped land

located in an unincorporated portion of Salt Lake County (the "Russell Property" and the
"Coulter Property"). R. 69-70, Affidavit of Roger Russell U 3; R. 218, Affidavit of Nathan
Coulter H 6. The Russell Property consists of approximately 3.67 acres and is located several
hundred yards north of the Coulter Property. See R. 264, Map. The land between the
Russell Property and the Coulter Property consists of essentially four parcels owned by four
unrelated parties (the "Intervening Properties"). Id.; R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI
12, 13. The properties are situated such that it is possible to develop all of them together
as one subdivision. See R. 264, Map.
2.

Russell intended to personally develop and subdivide the Russell Property and

had hired engineers to design a layout for subdivision development. R. 218, Affidavit of
Nathan Coulter U 7. Coulter was in the business of real estate development and also had
plans to develop its property. R. 342, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 5. Upon
learning of their similar development interests, the parties engaged in discussions and
negotiations concerning joint development of their properties and/or sale of the Russell
Property to Coulter. Id.
3.

As a result of their negotiations, Coulter prepared the Letter Agreement to

be signed by Russell which memorialized Russell's offer to sell subdivision lots to be
developed in the future by Coulter on the Russell Property. R. 70, Affidavit of Roger
Russell W 4, 5. Russell signed the Letter Agreement on April 27, 1991. Id. Russell
understood that along with development of the Russell Property, Coulter intended to acquire
3

the Intervening Properties and develop all properties together as a large, single subdivision.
R. 218-19, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter UK 7-8,12. Coulter paid no money for Russell's offer
to sell. R. 69-70, Affidavit of Roger Russell 1f 3.
4.

The description of the property offered for sale in the Letter Agreement

provides: "your lots west of 1700 East at 10800 South." R. 10, Letter Agreement. When
the Letter Agreement was signed, there were no developed "lots." At present, no subdivision
plat has been prepared, and no legislative approval has been obtained for commencement
of subdivision development.

See R. 228, Memorandum in Opposition to Summary

Judgment. The Russell Property remains an undeveloped 3.67-acre parcel. See R. 61,
Affidavit of George Shaw WI 6-8; see R. 2, Complaint 11 4; R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell
II 12;
5.

When the Letter Agreement was signed, the parties were uncertain as to how

many lots would or could eventually be developed on the Russell Property. The parties
believed and expected that Sandy City would zone the property for 15,000 or 10,000 squarefoot lots which would allow for development of eight or ten lots. R. 217-18, Affidavit of
Nathan Coulter 11 5; R. 344, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter U 10.
6.

Under the Letter Agreement, the price to be paid by Coulter for the

completed lots was $26,500 per lot with the price to increase $100 per lot per month for
each month a lot remained unpurchased after development of the subdivision. The relevant
language from the Letter Agreement provides:
Price: $26,500 per lot during the 1st month following
completion of the lots; price of each lot to increase $100 per
lot each month thereafter until each lot is closed.
4

Upon completion of the subdivision development we offer to
pay you $1,500 per lot; the balance of the purchase price
($25,000 at the outset) to be paid upon closing of each lot.
R. 10, Letter Agreement.
7.

No outside date was provided in the Letter Agreement for Coulter to complete

subdivision development and, thus, trigger its right to purchase the completed lots. R. 10,
Letter Agreement. However, the parties understood that Coulter would forthwith begin
development and that the lots would be completed and purchased beginning in Spring 1992.
R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 12; R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter
11 14.
8.

Coulter never submitted any formal application with Sandy City to annex the

Russell Property which was a necessary prerequisite to subdivision development. R. 61,
Affidavit of George Shaw 11 7.
9.

Coulter failed to perform any physical work on the Russell Property in

furtherance of subdivision development. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell II 12; see R. 228,
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment,
10.

Coulter failed to acquire any of the four Intervening Properties by Spring 1992

as was necessary to begin meaningful work on its large, single subdivision plan. R. 219,
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 13.
11.

Even though the parties intended for Coulter to have completed subdivision

development and tendered payment for the lots by Spring 1992, Russell cooperated with
Coulter and acquiesced to approximately six months of additional time for performance
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based on weekly or biweekly updates provided by Coulter after such original time had
lapsed. R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI 12-13.
12.

In November 1992, approximately six months after Coulter was to have

completed development of the Russell Property, the LDS Church offered to purchase the
Russell Property. Russell informed Coulter of his intention to accept because Coulter had
neither completed subdivision development nor purchased the lots by Spring 1992 as
promised. R. 3, Complaint 1 12; R. 70, Affidavit of Roger RusseU 11 9; R. 219-20, Affidavit
of Nathan Coulter 11 14.
13.

Problems and disputes arising out of Russell's intended sale to the LDS

Church led to negotiations between the parties and the LDS Church whereby all agreed that
Russell and Coulter would exchange properties and the LDS Church would then buy a
portion of the Coulter Property from Russell as the owner. R. 3, Complaint 1f 13; R. 70,
Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 10; R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 15. Russell was to
receive a total of $230,000 through the exchange agreement. R. 21, Real Property Exchange
Agreement. The exchange agreement fell through. However, because the LDS Church was
still interested in buying property in the area, Coulter later sold a portion of the Coulter
Property to the LDS Church. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 16.
14.

Another year-and-a-half passed and, in May 1994, a competing developer

offered to buy the Russell Property. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 11. In furtherance
of the offer, the developer took the first step toward development and submitted an
annexation petition to Sandy City. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter H 18; R. 61, Affidavit
of George Shaw 1111 7-8. On September 13, 1994, Sandy City annexed the Russell Property
6

and zoned it for minimum 20,000 square-foot residential lots. R. 61, 67-68, Affidavit of
George Shaw If 8 and Exhibit "D" thereto.
15.

On September 14,1994, three-and-a-half years after the Letter Agreement was

signed and one day after the Russell Property was annexed and zoned by Sandy City,
Coulter commenced this action for specific performance of the Letter Agreement. R. 1-52,
Complaint.
16.

As part of its lawsuit, Coulter alleges that it provided substantial, valuable, and

beneficial improvements as follows: (1) redesigning plans for a single subdivision which
include the Coulter Property, the Intervening Properties, and the Russell Property; (2)
rallying neighborhood support for rerouted access points for the planned single subdivision
through the Russell Property; (3) conducting extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt
the rerouted access plan; and (4) spending $35,000* to redesign and enlarge a master drain
system located on the Coulter Property to accommodate future hookup to lots on the
Russell Property. Appellant's Brief, at 17-18.
17.

Since Coulter has not developed or subdivided any of the properties which

were to be a part of his single subdivision plan, none of the properties (including the Russell
Property) have realized any tangible benefits from Coulter's preliminary efforts. See R. 228,
Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.

1

In other places in its appellate brief, Coulter alleges $50,000 was spent for this
improvement. See, e.g.. Appellant's Brief, at 27. The affidavits of Nathan Coulter filed in
this case also contain conflicting figures of $50,000 and $35,000 in total amounts spent. R.
219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter If 11 ($50,000); R. 345, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan
Coulter 11 12 ($35,000). Based on the fact that Coulter selected the $35,000 figure in its
statement of facts, Appellant's Brief, at 6, Russell will also rely on this figure.
7

18.

Coulter's $35,000 improvement to the master drain system is located on the

Coulter Property, and the Russell Property does not presently have dedicated line access to
that improvement. R. 262, Second Affidavit of Roger Russell K 6; R. 345-46, Supplemental
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter H 13. Pursuant to written contract, Russell has paid Coulter
$12,820 for his share of costs in redesigning and enlarging the master drain system which
may eventually service all lots to be developed on all properties. R. 262, Second Affidavit
of Roger Russell HIT 4-5; R. 52, Three-Way Work Exchange Agreement; R. 345-46,
Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MF 12-13.
19.

When Coulter commenced its action against Russell in September of 1994, it

was also suing for specific performance of a contract to purchase one of the four Intervening
Properties. R. 304-13, Certified Copy of Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith, Ltd.
v. Kemp.
20.

Coulter has never had any written or oral agreement to purchase one of the

four Intervening Properties. R. 320, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith HH 1-4.
21.

When Coulter commenced this lawsuit, it lacked authority to transact business

in Utah. R. 318, Certificate of Revocation.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
1.

Lack of Essential Terms in Writing.
Utah law requires that contracts for sale of real property must clearly set forth all

essential terms and must be in writing. Essential written terms include the description of the
property and the price. In this case, the property subject to Coulter's purchase rights was
described as "lots" to be developed on the Russell Property to be sold at a set price after
8

completion of the subdivision development. There were no lots in existence at the time the
Letter Agreement was signed. The Letter Agreement did not specify the total number or
the size of the lots to be developed and sold or written language concerning the parties'
agreement, if any, as to how the total number and size of the lots was to be determined.
The Statute of Frauds voids the Letter Agreement for this reason and prevents parole
evidence from being used to prove what the parties' agreement may have been.
Coulter has not sufficiently performed the Letter Agreement to satisfy the Statute of
Frauds to allow parol evidence to show the parties' agreement as to the total number and
size of the lots. Coulter's alleged improvements to the Russell Property in reliance on the
Letter Agreement are not exclusively referable to the alleged oral agreement and are not
substantial, valuable, or beneficial as required by law to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
Moreover, the acts alleged do not meet the evidentiary purpose of part performance and
estoppel to prove what the parties' agreement may have been.
Even ignoring application of the Statute of Frauds, Coulter's proffered parol evidence
concerning the parties' agreement is inconclusive and merely shows that the parties had
failed to agree on how to determine the total number and size of the lots. Accordingly, the
essential terms are not clear, and specific performance is appropriately denied.
2.

Lack of Outside Date for Vesting.
The Letter Agreement provides no outside date for Coulter to complete development

and exercise its rights to purchase "lots." The rule against perpetuities voids such remotely
vesting interests even if all conditions for vesting are met within the perpetuities period.
Utah courts apply this rule, even in commercial settings, to determine the validity of options
9

to purchase land. In this case, the language of the Letter Agreement does not meet the
vesting requirements of the rule against perpetuities and, thus, is void ab initio.
3.

Lapse of Purchase Rights.
If the Court rejects application of the rule against perpetuities, it must do what

Coulter failed to do when it drafted the Letter Agreement and supply an outside date for
exercise of its purported option rights. Under general contract principles, the Court must
view the totality of the circumstances to imply a reasonable time for performance and
exercise. In this case, such reasonable time is Spring 1992. The undisputed facts show that
this was the agreed and/or intended time that Coulter was to have completed development
and paid Russell. Equity will not tolerate that Russell continue to endure prejudicial delay
where he should have been paid for his property in Spring 1992. Additionally, the facts
indicate that Coulter will not be able to tender performance according to the original tenor
of the parties' agreement until months or years in the future or perhaps never. The Court
should, accordingly, determine that Coulter's rights under the Letter Agreement, if any, have
lapsed.
4.

Withdrawal of Offer/Recission of Contract.
Coulter paid no consideration for the Letter Agreement, and Russell is entitled to

withdrawal any unilateral offer created therein at any time before acceptance. Coulter has
never accepted Russell's offer by performing according to the terms of the Letter Agreement
which required development of lots and payment. RusseU is, thus, entitled to withdraw his
offer. Russell did so unequivocally in November 1992 when he informed Coulter of his
intent to sell the Russell Property to the LDS Church.
10

Coulter's alleged acts in reliance on the Letter Agreement are insufficient for
application of the doctrine of promissory estoppel to prevent Russell from withdrawing his
offer or supplying substitute consideration to support an enforceable contract. Such acts
were not substantial, valuable, or beneficial to Russell and were merely preparatory to what
was required for tender under the Letter Agreement. Moreover, to the extent any of
Coulter's acts may be construed sufficient to create an enforceable obligation, Russell is
justified to rescind based on Coulter's prejudicially-late, prospective performance.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE LETTER AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS AND
LACKS ESSENTIAL TERMS TO SUPPORT AN ENFORCEABLE CONTRACT
Under Utah law a contract involving the sale of land is not enforceable unless all the

essential elements and terms of such contract are clear and contained in a written document.
Utah Code Ann. § 25-5-3 (Statute of Frauds); Birdzell v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 121 Utah
412, 242 P.2d 578 (1952) ("It is fundamental that the memorandum which is relied on to
satisfy the Statute of Frauds must contain all the essential terms and provisions of the
contract."); see also Barnard v. Barnard, 700 P.2d 1113, 1114 (Utah 1985) ("Specific
enforcement may be granted only if the parties' intent as to the essential terms of the
agreement is clear.")
Essential elements of a land sales contract include a description that provides
reasonable certainty as to the size and location of the property and the price of such
property. See generally. 6A Richard R. Powell & Patrick J. Rohan, Powell on Real Property
II 880[l][b], at 81-35 to 81-46 (1995) (discussing that the Statute of Frauds requires essential
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terms of parties' contract to be set forth clearly in writing, including a description of the
property, the terms and conditions of the contract, and the price) [hereinafter cited as
Powell].
In this case, the Letter Agreement is void under the Statute of Frauds because its
written provisions do not include essential terms of the parties' agreement to define the total
number and size of the lots to be developed on the Russell Property subject to Coulter's
purported option rights. In addition, even if the parol evidence proffered by Coulter of the
parties' alleged agreement concerning the total number and size of the lots is considered
under partial performance or estoppel doctrines, such parol evidence lacks the certainty
required for specific performance of land sales contracts. This Court should, accordingly,
affirm the district court's ruling that the Letter Agreement is void and unenforceable.
A.

The Letter Agreement does not Include Written Language as to the Total Number
and Size of the Lots to be Developed on the Russell Property or a Formula to
Determine Such.

Referring to subdivision lots to be developed on the Russell Property by Coulter, the
written language of the Letter Agreement provides for sale of "your lots west of 1700 East
at 10800 South." R. 10, Letter Agreement. There were no lots when the Letter Agreement
was signed, and the existence of such lots was necessarily contingent upon annexation of the
Russell Property to Sandy City; adoption of a zoning ordinance covering the property; and
the preparation, approval, and filing of a final subdivision plat. Since, at the time the Letter
Agreement was signed, the total number and size of the lots was dependent upon these
administrative contingencies and non-existent documents, the description of "lots" in the
Letter Agreement is fatal to enforceability because it describes nothing. Berg v. Ting, 125
12

Wash. 2d 544, 886 P.2d 564, 568-69 (1995) (Grant of easement providing that location of
easement would be determined with regard to finally approved and recorded subdivision plat
held fatally defective and void under the Statute of Frauds because granting language
referred to "nonexistent instrument as defining the servient estate.") (emphasis in original);
see also Pitcher v. Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493-94 (1967) (Written contract
held not specifically enforceable where written language provided for sale of 30 acres of 189
acres owned by seller "as indicated by map" but no map was ever shown to the buyer.).2
Recognizing that the total number and size of the lots described in the Letter
Agreement cannot be defined by reference to nonexistent plat maps or other written
documents, Coulter argues that this Court should accept parol evidence establishing an
alleged agreement between the parties as to how the total number and size of the then nonexistent lots were to be determined. Coulter supports its position with reference to the

2

The Nebraska case discussed by Coulter, Bellevue College v. Greater Omaha Realty
Co.. 217 Neb. 183, 348 N.W.2d 837 (1987), to support its argument that a "lot" may be sold
even before it exists is distinguishable from the cases cited above and the case at hand. In
Bellevue. the amount of land to be conveyed was fixed at "approximately two acres" so there
was no question as to how much property was to be conveyed. In addition, even though the
final plat had not been recorded when the parties entered into their contract, the court was
able to examine preliminary plats to determine exactly where the property was to be located
on the finally approved plat.
Furthermore, it appears from an examination of certain of the
preliminary plats that the property ordered by the trial court to
be conveyed by Greater Omaha to Bellevue College is exactly
the land which was designated by Greater Omaha as a specific
lot in exhibits 15 and 16, first as Lot 40 and then as Lot 41.
Id. at 841. In contrast, in this case, the size of the lots was, and remains, uncertain, and
there was no preliminary plat map to ascertain the undefined lots described in the Letter
Agreement.
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generally accepted rule that where a property description is ambiguous, courts will entertain
extrinsic and parol evidence to more particularly define the property.

See Powell II

880[l][d][iii], at 81-40 to 81-42 (commenting that courts will generally allow extrinsic and
parol evidence to clarify ambiguities in property descriptions such as "Smith's Ranch," the
"Shell Building," the "office building on the corner of Main and Broadway," etc.).3
While parol evidence is generally admissible under the above-authority to clarify what
property was meant to be described in an ambiguous property description, this authority
does not establish that parol evidence may prove essential and material terms left out of the
parties' written agreement as to how they decided to describe the property. This subtle, but
important, distinction is illustrated in several Utah cases. For example, in Calder v. Third
Judicial District. 2 Utah 2d 309, 273 P.2d 168 (1954), the issue was whether a written
contract satisfied the Statute of Frauds where the language provided that purchaser could

3

Only two of the five Utah cases cited by Coulter for this proposition actually support
it. Rg,, Park West Village. Inc. v. Avise. 714 P.2d 1137 (Utah 1986) (address of property
along with physical boundaries at property address clarified ambiguity created by merely
describing property by address); Jacobson v. Cox. 115 Utah 102, 202 P.2d 714 (1949)
(description limited to "up in the old field, now under fence above Spring Branch Ditch"
reasonably described property where evident from extrinsic evidence that the description was
such that all parties in rural community knew what property was involved in transaction).
The other three cases cited involve situations where partial performance provided an
evidentiary foundation for an adequate and reasonably certain description of the property.
See Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (parties performance of agreement
reasonably identified lot to be conveyed at "corner of Hillview and Ninth East"); Hackford
v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah 1982) (three years of possessing certain 20 acres defined by
physical boundaries reasonably identified 20 acres to be excluded from contract describing
property as "Neola (420 acre Hackford Farm), Uinta County, State of Utah"); Stauffer v.
Call 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (physical possession and the making of substantial
improvement to two houses and connected acreage reasonably defined property subject to
ambiguous written agreement).
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purchase 200 acres selected from a larger tract owned by the seller. The contract was
challenged under the Statute of Frauds because the location of the 200 acres was not
described in the contract. Id. at 169. The court determined that even though the contract
did not describe the exact location of the 200 acres, the contract satisfied the Statute of
Frauds because the parties' agreement as to how that 200-acre parcel would be located was
included in the written language of the contract-namely, that the purchaser could select it.
Id. at 170. In contrast, where the property description can be determined only by reference
to a collateral or future agreement which is not in the written language of the parties'
contract, Utah courts hold such contracts to be unenforceable. Davison v. Robbins, 30 Utah
2d 338, 517 P.2d 1026, 1028 (1973) (Written contract held void under Statute of Frauds
where property was described in writing as "approx. 150 acres selling at $90.00 per acre" but
the final legal description was contingent on further agreement of the parties.); Pitcher v.
Lauritzen. 18 Utah 2d 368, 423 P.2d 491, 493-94 (1967) (Written contract held not
specifically enforceable where written language provided for sale of 30 acres of 189 acres
owned by seller "as indicated by map" but no map was ever shown to the buyer.); Vasels v.
LoGuidice. 740 P.2d 1375 (Utah App. 1987) (Written contract held unenforceable under the
Statute of Frauds where written language provided for sale of one parcel for $1,000,000
which was to be one of four parcels to be carved from 27 acres of land and written contract
did not provide how the size and shape of that parcel was to be determined but rather
provided that the final description was to be approved by all the parties in writing.).
The Statute of Frauds ensures that all essential and material terms of a contract will
be proved by reference to a writing and not by parol evidence thus eliminating the possibility
15

of perjury, fraud, and uncertainty in land sales agreements. Powell H 880[l][d][iii], at 81-39.
The parol evidence Coulter seeks to introduce is not to clarify what lots were subject to its
purported option rights-because no such lots existed then or now. Rather, the introduction
of such parol evidence is admittedly sought to prove the essential and "material details
required for the transfer of the property." Appellant's Brief at 14. This parol evidence-to
prove what the parties' agreement was-is barred by the Statute of Frauds and the Letter
Agreement is void for lack of an adequate description of the total number and size of the
lots subject to Coulter's purported option rights.
B.

The Statute of Frauds is not Satisfied by Recharacterization of the Letter
Agreement as an Option to Purchase the Russell Property as a Single Parcel

In an apparent recognition of the problems created by seeking specific enforcement
of right to purchase undefined lots that have never existed, Coulter argues that the Letter
Agreement should be construed as an option for purchase of the entire Russell Property as
a single parcel. Through such recharacterization, Coulter explains that the Statute of Frauds
is met because there is no dispute as to the size and location of the Russell Property.
Appellant's Brief, at 16. Coulter further explains that the reference to "lots" was merely a
means by which the parties agreed on a total purchase price for the entire Russell Property.
Id. Even if the Court were willing to accept this recharacterization, such spin does not avoid
application of the Statute of Frauds-it merely shifts the reason for voidness from lack of
essential terms concerning the description of the property to lack of essential terms
concerning the price of the property. Birdzell 242 P.2d at 580 (amount of rent is essential
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term); Powell 1 880[l][d][v], at 81-44 to 81-46 (discussing price as essential written term for
land sales contract).
The price for the lots in the Letter Agreement was fixed as $26,500.4 Assuming,
arguendo, that the Letter Agreement was for the sale of the Russell Property as one parcel,
the size and total number of the lots directly affect the price. If twelve lots were developed,
the price would equal $318,000; if ten, $265,000; if eight, $212,000; and if six, $159,000.
Because there were no lots when the Letter Agreement was signed, the total number of lots
and, consequently, the total price for the Russell Property is impossible to determine from
the written language of the Letter Agreement. Coulter must, therefore, rely on parol
evidence to show what the parties' agreement may have been regarding the total number
of lots to be developed. As previously discussed, because the terms of such alleged
agreement are a material and essential part of the parties' agreement, parol evidence
establishing such terms is barred by the Statute of Frauds, and the Letter Agreement is void.
See, e.g.. Moore & Assoc. Realty v. Arrowhead at Vail 892 P.2d 367, 371 (Colo. App. 1994)
(Letter of intent to sell specified lot held void under the Statute of Frauds where price for
lot was based on a set price for condominium units to be developed on the lot and the
written language of the letter of intent did not specify how may condominium units would
be built or a formula for determining such number.).

4

The Letter Agreement further provided for an increase of $100.00 per lot per month
"following completion of the lots." R. 10, Letter Agreement.
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C

Coulter's Parol Evidence of the Parties3 Alleged Agreement Should Not Be
Considered Under the Doctrines of Partial Performance or Equitable Estoppel

Notwithstanding the writing requirement imposed by the Statute of Frauds, Coulter
argues that because it has partially performed the Letter Agreement, it should be permitted
to introduce parol evidence establishing the material and essential terms concerning the total
number and size of the lots which it left out of the Letter Agreement. However, as a matter
of law, the acts alleged by Coulter are insufficient to show part performance or support an
estoppel theory sufficient to overcome application of the Statute of Frauds. See Bear Island
Water Ass'n. Inc. v. Brown. 125 Idaho 717, 874 P.2d 528, 533 (1994) (whether acts are
sufficient as part performance is a matter of law).
The doctrines of partial performance and equitable estoppel in connection with oral
contracts involving the sale of land were fashioned by courts of equity not to "annul the
Statute of Frauds, but only to prevent its being made the means of perpetrating a fraud."
Coleman v.Dillman. 624 P.2d 713, 715 (Utah 1981) (footnote omitted); Jacobson v. Cox, 202
P.2d 714, 721 & 723 (1949). Such doctrines are to be "applied with great care" by the
courts, and typically require the purchaser to show (1) actual open and exclusive possession
of the land with the seller's consent; (2) substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements
to the land; (3) valuable consideration given in exchange for the conveyance; and (4) that
all the foregoing were exclusively referable to the oral contract. Coleman, 624 P.2d at 715;
see also Powell 11 880[2][c][i], at 81-69 to 81-70 (discussing that part performance generally
requires paying the contract price, taking possession of the property, and making
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improvements thereon; further commenting that most courts will require at least two of the
three conditions to be satisfied).
Since Coulter does not have possession of the lots and paid no consideration5 for its
purported option to purchase such lots, its partial performance and estoppel theories must
rest solely on whether it made substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements to the
Russell Property which were exclusively referable to the Letter Agreement.

Coulter

specifically alleges four categories of substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements as
follows: (1) redesigning plans for a single subdivision which would include the Coulter
Property, the Intervening Properties, and the Russell Property; (2) rallying neighborhood
support for rerouted access points for the planned single subdivision through the Russell
Property; (3) conducting extensive negotiations with Sandy City to adopt the rerouted access
plan; and (4) spending $35,000 to redesign and enlarge a master drain system located on the
Coulter Property to accommodate future hookup to the Russell Property when the single
subdivision was complete. Appellant's Brief, at 17-18.
Case law establishes that Coulter's first three categories of alleged substantial,
valuable, and beneficial improvements are insufficient to support a claim of partial
performance or estoppel. Redesigning plans, rallying neighborhood support, and even
negotiations with city officials are merely preparatory and ancillary to the condition

5

Coulter claims that its alleged partial performance constitutes "ample consideration."
Appellant's Brief, at 26-29. It is clear, however, that no consideration was given in exchange
for the Letter Agreement and Coulter's "consideration" arguments are more in the nature
of promissory estoppel. See infra. In any event, for purposes of part performance and
estoppel theories, the acts alleged in reliance of the agreement cannot serve as both the
"consideration" and the "part performance."
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precedent of Coulter's right to purchase lots. Coulter was to "complete the subdivision
development." R. 10, Letter Agreement (emphasis added). Preparatory and ancillary acts
to fulfill this condition to purchase do not provide an adequate equitable basis for avoiding
the Statute of Frauds. For example, in Baugh v. Logan City, 27 Utah 2d 291, 495 P.2d 814
(1972), the Utah Supreme Court rejected the purchasers' argument that it had partly
performed an oral contract because they had "at great expense to themselves" surveyed the
land promised to be conveyed. Id. at 815. The court rejected the purchasers' arguments
and explained as follows:
Acts merely ancillary to an oral agreement for the sale
of lands, although attended with expense, are not considered
acts of part performance sufficient to relieve the case from the
provisions of the statute of frauds.
Id. at 817 (quoting DeMarco v. Estlow. 18 N.J. Super. 30, 86 A.2d 446, 447-48 (1952)); see
also Williams v. Fulton. 30 Wash. App. 173, 632 P.2d 920 (1981) (Part performance not
shown where purchaser paid $1,000 earnest money, conducted various tests and surveys on
the property, and arranged for the property's zoning designation to be changed.).
Additionally, it is clear from the record that none of Coulter's efforts relating to redesigning
of plans, rallying neighborhood support, and meeting with city officials have done anything
to provide a tangible benefit the Russell Property. Coulter has been unable to consummate
its single subdivision plan for nearly five years, and the record strongly suggests that it may
never accomplish what it originally set forth to do.6

6

Unless and until Coulter is able to

It is apparent that Coulter has several major obstacles to overcome before it can or
will develop the Property as planned and promised. These include (1) rezoning of all
properties included in its single subdivision plan to allow for building of 10,000 or 15,000
20

bring all of his preliminary plans, neighborhood support, and governmental approvals
together to actually develop the Russell Property as part of a single subdivision, all such
preliminary acts are of no value or benefit to the Russell Property. As a matter of law, this
Court should, therefore, determine that such acts do not constitute part performance or
support an estoppel theory.
Coulter's fourth category of alleged substantial, valuable, and beneficial improvements
regarding the $35,000 spent to redesign and enlarge the master drain system, although
representing a substantial expenditure by Coulter, is also insufficient to prove part
performance or support an estoppel theory. This improvement fails as part performance
because it is not on the Russell Property but on the Coulter Property. Accordingly, it should
also be considered ancillary and will not actually benefit the Russell property unless Coulter
is able to successfully consummate its single subdivision plan and install connecting lines.
R. 261, Second Affidavit of Roger Russell, HIT 4, 6 (establishing that improvements are
located on the Coulter Property and that no connecting lines run between it and the Russell
Property). More importantly, however, the alleged improvement fails as partial performance

square-foot lots as originally contemplated, R. 67-68, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning
Ordinance of the Russell Property, (2) resolving a lawsuit with one Intervening Property
owner, R. 304-13, Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith, Ltd. v. Kemp, and (3)
purchasing a parcel from another Intervening Property owner who has, as yet, declined to
sell. R. 319-322, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith. Even if all preliminary matters were
resolved, actual development would take substantial efforts and significant time to
accomplish. See Sandy City Code of Ordinances, Subdivision Regulations § 15-34-1 et seq.
(Draft Feb. 6,1996) (administrative, bonding, and construction requirements for subdivision
development). At present, it is also questionable whether Coulter can even legally purchase
or develop any property as its authority to transact business in Utah has been revoked. See
R. 318, Certificate of Revocation.
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because it is not "exclusively referable" to the oral agreement sought to be enforced. Russell
knew of Coulter's single subdivision plan and agreed to cooperate in its development efforts.
R. 218-19, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter MI 7-8, 12. In acknowledgment of the fact that the
redesign and enlargement of the main drain system to be installed on the Coulter Property
might eventually benefit the Russell Property (even if Coulter never completed its single
subdivision as planned), Russell agreed (in a separate written agreement) to pay, and later
paid, Coulter $12,820 for his share of the cost to enlarge the master drain. R. 261, Second
Affidavit of Roger Russell MI 4-5. Coulter even attached the parties' written agreement
entitled "THREE-WAY WORK EXCHANGE AGREEMENT" to its Complaint which
expressly sets forth Coulter's contractual obligation to "enlarge a master drain system to be
installed as per the design of Bush & Gudgell; this enlargement requested by and for the
benefit of certain property under the control of Dr. Roger Russell." R. 52, Three-Way Work
Exchange Agreement. Accordingly, since Coulter's expenses incurred in redesigning and
enlarging the master drain system were not "exclusively referable" to the Letter Agreement,
such expenditures cannot support partial performance or equitable estoppel. See Coleman
v. Dillman. 624 P.2d 713, 715-16 (Utah 1981) (rejecting enforcement of oral agreement
where improvements and possession were not "exclusively referable" to oral sales contract
but equally referable to lease).
A further problem with Coulter's part performance and estoppel arguments is that
the alleged acts do not assist the Court in determining the essential terms of the contract
which Coulter left out-namely, the total number and size of the lots to be developed on the
Russell Property. As previously set forth, partial performance does not "annul the Statute
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of Frauds, but only [prevents] its being made the means of perpetrating fraud." Coleman,
624 P.2d at 715. Part performance only satisfies the goals of the Statute of Frauds to
prevent fraud and provide certainty if the part performance clearly evidences the terms of
the parties' agreement that should have been in writing but were not. Accordingly, courts
require that part performance show evidence of the material terms left out of the parties
agreement. For example, where the property is ambiguously described, courts will look at
the acts of part performance to fulfill an evidentiary function to define what the parties left
out of their agreement. See, e.g.. Reed v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980) (suit for specific
performance upheld where extrinsic evidence of parties' actions specifically identified
property subject to ambiguous property description); Hackford v. Snow, 657 P.2d 1271 (Utah
1982) (same); Stauffer v. Call. 589 P.2d 1219 (Utah 1979) (oral agreement enforced
notwithstanding Statute of Frauds where acts of parties and natural boundaries adequately
defined property subject to agreement). The court in Berg v. Ting, 125 Wash. 2d 544, 886
P.2d 564 (1995), emphasized this principle in a case with similar problems as those
encountered in this case. The parties had agreed in writing to grant an easement with
reference to a subdivision plat that was not in existence at the time the agreement was
signed. Id. at 568. The court held that the agreement could not be enforced under the
Statute of Frauds because the written agreement referred to a nonexistent instrument to
define the servient estate and did not reference an instrument which contained such a
description. Id. at 569. The grantees of the easement argued for enforcement of the
easement because their withdrawal of opposition to the subdivision platting served as partial
performance of the agreement. Id. at 567, 572. Even though the parties had a written
23

agreement and had arguably partly-performed through withdrawal of their opposition, the
court rejected the grantee's argument because the partial performance alleged "reveal[ed]
nothing about the character or terms of any contract." Id. at 572. Similarly, in this case,
none of the acts alleged by Coulter satisfy the evidentiary function of the equitable doctrines
of part performance and estoppel necessary to overcome the Statute of Frauds because they
fail to define what the parties' agreement concerning the total number and size of the lots
to be developed on the Russell Property. For the reason that Coulter's acts are legally
insufficient to support partial performance and estoppel theories and for this additional
reason, Coulter's partial performance and estoppel arguments should be rejected by the
Court.
D.

The Parol Evidence Proffered by Coulter Fails to Clearly Describe the Parties9
Agreement

Assuming, arguendo, that the Court is willing to consider Coulter's parol evidence,
it must determine whether such evidence provides clear and convincing evidence of the
material and essential terms left out of the Letter Agreement.
The evidence must show a meeting of the minds based on an
offer and a sufficient acceptance, as well as the consideration
necessary for a valid contract. There must also be no proof of
mistake, misrepresentation or illegality that would otherwise
invalidate the contract. Generally, the standard for proving the
existence of an oral contract and its terms is demanding. Proof
requires clear and convincing evidence.
Powell 11 880[2][a], at 81-57 to 81-58 (emphasis added); see also Barnard v. Barnard, 700
P.2d 1113, 1114 (1985) ("Specific enforcement may be granted only if the parties' intent as
to the essential terms of the agreement is clear."); In re Roth's Estate, 2 Utah 2d 40, 269
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P.2d 278, 280 (1954) (specifically enforceable land contract must be "definite, certain and
fair").
In this case, the material and essential terms which Coulter wishes to prove by parol
evidence is the parties' agreement as to the total number and size of the lots that were to
be developed on the Russell Property. Because Sandy City has unfavorably zoned the
Russell Property for 20,000 square-foot lots, only six lots may be developed. R. 61, 67-68,
Affidavit of George Shaw If 8 and Exhibits "D" thereto. Accordingly, Coulter argues that its
parol evidence clearly and convincingly shows that the parties agreed that the total number
and size of the "lots" would be determined by whatever zoning was ultimately approved by
Sandy City with Russell to exclusively bear the benefit or burden of favorable or unfavorable
zoning. Appellant's Brief, at 4, 14, 16.
However, contrary to Coulter's arguments, the affidavit testimony relied on
establishes, at the very most, that the parties agreed that the total number of lots would be
eight or ten based on their mutual understanding and expectation that Sandy City would
zone the Russell Property for 15,000 or 10,000 square-foot lots.
The zoning for the 3.67-Acre Parcel had not been finalized at
the time of the Option Agreement. Russell and I believed that
we could procure R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning, which would allow
8 to 10 lots to be developed. The purchase price for the 3.67Acre Parcel was thus contingent on the zoning that could be
obtained.
R. 217-18, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 5.
Dr. Russell assured me in conversations both prior to April 27,
1991 and thereafter that he was confident that his contacts with
the local neighbors would be sufficient to obtain their
agreement to the proposed R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning. Dr.
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Russell told me that he had friends in the nearby Cobblestone
subdivision with whom he had already spoken, and that no one
in that subdivision was opposed to the R-l-15 or R-l-10 zoning.
Dr. Russell also said that he could deliver approval from the
Bell Canyon Homeowners Association since he sat on the board
of directors of that entity. In at least one conversation prior to
April 27, 1991, Dr. Russell and I discussed the fact that
depending upon the zoning Dr. Russell was able to deliver, the
3.67-Acre Parcel would accommodate differing numbers of
different sized lots, and thus Dr. Russell would receive more
money for the denser zoning.
R. 344, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 10.7
This parol evidence not only lacks clear and convincing proof that the parties agreed
that Russell would assume all risks of adverse zoning but also shows that there was no
meeting of the minds as to the total number, size, and price of the lots if zoning less
favorable than 15,000 square-foot lots was ultimately legislated by Sandy City.8 Accordingly,

7

Further evidence that the Letter Agreement was likely based on the parties'
assumption that at least eight, and probably ten, lots could be developed can be found in the
terms of the parties' unconsummated exchange agreement which was negotiated when
Russell's attempted sale of the Russell Property to the LDS Church was thwarted. Through
that transaction, the parties provided that Russell would receive a total of $230,000 for the
transfer of the Russell Property. R. 21, Complaint, Exhibit 6. Dividing this number by the
$26,500 price of lots in the Letter Agreement evidences the equivalent yield from 8.67 lots.
8

To the extent Coulter may argue in its reply brief that Russell is to blame for the
unfavorable zoning, such argument should be rejected. The record establishes that the
Coulter Property was annexed prior to the Russell Property and had already set the standard
for 20,000 square-foot-lot zoning of the contiguous properties before the Russell Property
was annexed and zoned. See R. 294-99, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning of the
Coulter & Smith Property; cf. R. 67-69, Ordinance for Annexation and Zoning of the Russell
Property. In any event, zoning is not something that a property owner may dictate, but is
a legislative function and an activity wholly within the discretion of the legislative bodies of
municipalities. See Crestview-Holladay Homeowners Ass'n v. Engh Floral Co., 545 P.2d
1150 (Utah 1976).
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because the parties had not agreed on how their agreement would be affected if the Russell
Property was not zoned as understood, expected, and contemplated by the parties, the
essential and material terms necessary to enforce the Letter Agreement are lacking, and the
parties' alleged oral agreement cannot be specifically enforced. See generally 17A Am. Jur.
2d, Contracts § 26, at 54-55 (1991) ("There must be mutual asset or a meeting of the minds
on all essential elements or terms in order to form a binding contract.").9
II.

THE LETTER AGREEMENT IS VOID UNDER THE RULE AGAINST
PERPETUITIES
The rule against perpetuities provides that "no interest is good unless it must vest, if

at all, not later than twenty-one years after some life in being at the creation of the interest."
W. Barton Leach, Perpetuities in a Nutshell 51 Harv. L. Rev. 638, 639 (1938) [hereinafter
cited as "Nutshell"]. This rule applies to all contingent interests including options and
specifically requires that options be drafted so that there is no possibility that the option may
be exercised outside of the perpetuities period. See Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 29
Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973); Anderson v. Anderson. 15 Utah 2d 7, 386 P.2d 406
(1963); Fisher v. Bailev. 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985 (1963); Nutshell at 660-62. Failure
to satisfy the rule against perpetuities causes the interest to be void ab initio, and the interest
cannot be cured even if the contingency occurs within the prescribed time period. Nutshell
at 642; 61 Am. Jur. 2d Perpetuities § 26 (1982).

9

The fact that the parties were mistaken that zoning could be manipulated further
shows that the oral agreement as alleged by Coulter was based on a mutual mistake and,
thus, not enforceable. See generally 17A Am. Jur. 2d, Contracts § 213, at 220-21 (1991).
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By drafting the Letter Agreement to tie its option rights to "completion of the lots"
and "completion of the subdivision development," Coulter created an interest void under the
rule against perpetuities. R. 10, Letter Agreement. The Letter Agreement has no outside
time period for Coulter to complete the subdivision and, thus, no outside date for exercise
of its purported option rights on the completed lots. As explained by Professor Leach in
describing the case of the "inexhaustible gravel pit," this contingency of possible unlimited
duration voids the interest.
T was in the sand and gravel business. He owned gravel pits
which, at the time of his death, would have been exhausted in
4 years if worked at the rate which was habitual with T. T died,
leaving a will which devised to trustees the gravel pits in trust to
work until the same were exhausted, then to sell the pits and
divide the proceeds among T's issue then living. The pits were
actually exhausted in 6 years. But the gift to issue was held bad
on the ground that they might not have exhausted within 21
years.
Nutshell at 644-45.
Coulter directs this Court to cases from California and North Carolina for support
that courts no longer use the rule against perpetuities to void remotely vesting interests in
commercial transactions but have abandoned it in favor of general contract rules which allow
the court to infer a reasonable time requirement for vesting if no time is given. See Wong
v. DiGrazia, 60 Cal. 2d 525, 386 P.2d 817, 35 Cal. Rptr 241 (1963); Rodin v. Merritt 48 N.C.
App. 64; 268 S.E.2d 539 (1980). While these cases perhaps establish that the Letter
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Agreement would be valid in California and North Carolina, they do not establish the law
in Utah which applies in this case.10
In, Fisher v. Bailey, 14 Utah 2d 424, 385 P.2d 985 (1963), a case similar to the case
at hand, the Utah Supreme Court affirmed that the rule against perpetuities applies in
commercial transactions. The sellers challenged the validity of a complex contract whereby
they agreed to improve, plat, subdivide, and sell numerous subdivision lots to a construction
company. The sellers' based their challenge on the fact that the terms of the contract gave
the construction company "an option to purchase part of these lots after a life or lives in
being and 21 years and the gestation period." Id. at 986. Rather than dispose of the sellers'
argument by explaining that contract rules would apply in this commercial transaction, the
court painstakingly analyzed the written language of the parties agreement with reference
to the rule against perpetuities and determined that it did not leave any contingencies of
unlimited duration but provided for exercise of purchase rights within the perpetuities
period.
Although the contract does not expressly state that all of
the lots must be transferred on or before July 1, 1964, it does
definitely so indicate. It not only provides for the development
and release of the 61 lots before any mention is made of the

10

The three Utah cases cited by Coulter to show that Utah has abandoned the rule
against perpetuities in commercial transactions are inapposite. See Cooper v. Deseret
Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. 757 P.2d 483 (Utah 1988); Bradford v. Alvev & Sons, 621
P.2d 1240 (Utah 1980); Downtown Athletic Club v. Horman, 740 P.2d 275 (Utah App.
1987). In none of these cases was the rule against perpetuities raised by the parties or
discussed by the court. Additionally, Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savings & Loan Assoc, 757
P.2d 483 (Utah 1988), did not even involve a real property "vesting" issue, but only how long
a bank had to enforce contractual rights pursuant to a due on sale clause in a mortgage
transaction.
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additional 21 lots, and provides for a change in the purchase
price in case of a change in the cost of development, but it
provides for the improvement of 12 lots within 90 days, then 49
lots after six months, and then provides for the holding of the
additional 21 lots subject exclusively to the order of the buyer
until July 1, 1964, but gave the Company no right to purchase
those lots after that time. There was a firm agreement by the
buyer to purchase and the seller to sell the 61 lots, only the
time for the release of such lots which must be after January 1,
1960, was left to the option of the Company, and the sellers
Bailey agreed to hold the additional 21 lots until July 1, 1964, to
the order of the Company. All this fits into a pattern that all of
the lots were to be transferred on or before the last mentioned
date. We conclude that under these circumstances it would be
unreasonable to hold that the option to purchase any of these
lots could be exercised any substantial period of time after
January 1,1964, and therefore this contract does not violate the
rule against perpetuities.
Id. at 987-98;11 accord Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills. 29 Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737

11

Justice Crockett concurred in the result of Bailey but suggested that the court should
have analyzed the transaction based on contract principles instead of the rule against
perpetuities.
I concur and offer these further observations: in a
contract of this character where something is to be done in
connection with planned future activities, as was the conveyance
of these lots, and specification of a definite time is omitted, the
law will imply that it is to be done within some such reasonable
time as it must sensibly be supposed was contemplated by the
parties. What the reasonable time is to be determined by
looking at all of the facts and circumstances. That is what
should be done here.
Fisher. 385 P.2d at 989.
The fact that Justice Crockett supported that contract rules should supplant the rule
against perpetuities and the majority of the court decided the case with respect to the rule
against perpetuities shows that Utah law has not abandoned this important and long-standing
real property doctrine. In addition, the fact that the Supreme Court of Utah has continued
to apply the rule against perpetuities in commercial option transactions suggest Justice
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(1973) (court analyzed option agreement in commercial setting for validity under the rule
against perpetuities).
In contrast to the agreement in Fisher, the Letter Agreement cannot be construed
in any manner to provide an outside date for exercise of Coulter's purported option rights
because it has no date for subdivision completion. Even though Coulter emphasized in its
pleadings below that the subdivision was to be completed "forthwith" and with all "due
diligence," this fact does not provide an outside date for subdivision completion and exercise
of rights within the perpetuities period. See R. 227, Memorandum in Opposition to
Summary Judgment.12 Indeed, Coulter by initiating this lawsuit and pursuing this appeal
has already taken the position that its option rights in the Letter Agreement last nearly five
years. Moreover, since no work has been done to begin formal subdivision development of
the Russell Property, Coulter will no-doubt require substantial additional time to exercise
its purported rights. Russell asks this Court to recognize that Utah law has not abandoned
the rule against perpetuities voiding remotely vesting interests in commercial transactions
and that, therefore, the Letter Agreement is void.

Crockett's views have yet to win the day. See, e.g.. Hidden Meadows Dev. Co. v. Mills, 29
Utah 2d 469, 511 P.2d 737 (1973) (court analyzed option agreement in commercial setting
under the rule against perpetuities).
12

Coulter has chosen not to emphasize the language of the Letter Agreement and its
affidavits emphasizing the urgency of subdivision development in this appeal. Russell
assumes that this is because such arguments militate in favor of a ruling that any time for
exercise beyond Spring 1992 was beyond a "reasonable time." See infra.
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HI.

ANY PURCHASE RIGHTS CREATED BY THE LETTER AGREEMENT HAVE
LAPSED
In the event the Court declines to apply the rule against perpetuities in favor of

applying general contract principles, the Court must determine and imply a "reasonable
time" term in the Letter Agreement for exercise of Coulter's purported option rights. See
Cooper v. Deseret Federal Savs. & Loan. 757 P.2d 483, 485 (Utah App. 1988) ("When a
contract fails to specify the time by which a certain act must be performed, the law implies
the act be performed within a reasonable time.). To determine what time term the law
should imply, the Court should evaluate the facts surrounding the transaction to ascertain
what time term may have been contemplated by the parties or is otherwise reasonable under
the totality of the circumstances. See generally Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d 1240,
1242 (Utah 1980). Coulter contends that this Court cannot determine a "reasonable time"
term for exercise of its rights without further proceedings in the district court preceded by
discovery and full trial preparation by the parties. Russell respectfully submits that further
use of private and judicial resources to establish more facts is unnecessary because the
undisputed facts already before the Court conclusively establish that Coulter's rights, if any,
have lapsed.
In determining the reasonable time for Coulter to have tendered performance and
exercised its purchase rights, the Court should initially consider the circumstances presented
by the transaction involved. In this case, the transaction involves an asserted option to
purchase lots to be developed on the Russell Property. Because the agreement involves a
right to purchase land at a specified price, Russell would normally be entitled to strictly
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enforce any timing provisions. See Catmull v. Johnson, 541 P.2d 793, 706 (Utah 1975) ("[B]y
its very nature, an option is an instrument as to which time is of the essence.") (footnote
omitted). In addition, equities should be balanced in Russell's favor because he is the party
who must bear the burdens and carry the expenses associated with the property including
maintenance of financing, insurance, taxes, and tort liability while waiting for Coulter to
tender performance. See, e.g., Bradford v. Alvey & Sons, 621 P.2d at 1242 (vendor in land
sales agreement conditioned on performance of purchaser entitled to equitable deference
based on the fact that the vendor is bound while the purchaser may choose whether to
perform); Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Or. 530, 226 P.2d 814, 817 (1951) (discussing equitable
considerations in favor of vendor under option agreement including carrying property at
vendor's expense, risk of loss, costs, insurance, and burden to patrol against trespass). The
Court should also consider that the parties, presumably in recognition of costs to be borne
by Russell in the event of delay, bargained for price adjustments for late payments. R. 10,
Letter Agreement (providing that the price of the individual lots would increase $100 per
month after completion of the lots). Within this context, the Court must determine when
Coulter was required to have completed development and paid Russell for the lots.
The undisputed facts show that the parties intended Coulter to have completed
development of subdivision lots on the Russell Property-thus triggering its right to purchase
lots and the agreed $100 per lot per month increase-by Spring 1992. Russell has testified
in his affidavit that Coulter "promised" to finish subdivision development by Spring 1992.
R. 70, Affidavit of Roger Russell MI 6-7. Coulter denies that it promised anything, but
admits that the parties intended that subdivision development would be accomplished with
33

"all due diligence" and the parties "believed that such could be done by the Spring of 1992."
R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 12; see also R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan
Coulter K 14 (same). The evidence submitted by Coulter even expresses a realization that
its performance was past due in Spring 1992 because it is at this time that Coulter
apparently felt obligated to consult with Russell on a "weekly or biweekly basis" regarding
its progress. R. 219, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 1f 13. Moreover, it is further undisputed
that Russell took no acts in contravention of Coulter's rights until November 1992, well
beyond Spring 1992, when Russell informed Coulter of his intent to sell to the LDS Church
because of Coulter's inability tofinishsubdivision development and purchase lots within the
time promised. R. 71, Affidavit of Roger Russell 11 15. Indeed, Coulter even admits that
Russell was cooperative and acquiesced to its delays until Russell gave notice of his intent
to sell to the LDS Church-at which time Coulter considered Russell to be in breach of the
Letter Agreement. R. 220, Affidavit of Nathan Coulter U 15. These facts show that Spring
1992 is the proper time term to be implied by law for Coulter to have exercised its rights.
These facts also show that Russell did not interfere with Coulter's performance and even
acquiesced to an additional reasonable time when Coulter failed to show appreciable
progress toward meeting the conditions of its performance within the time period intended
by the parties. There is no additional need for factual development at trial to determine
that Coulter's option rights have lapsed.
Coulter's arguments that equitable adjustments may need to be made because its
performance has been thwarted by contingencies beyond its control such as unfruitful
negotiations with the Intervening Property owners and difficulties with government
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authorities should be rejected. Appellant's Brief, at 21. Coulter, not Russell, is the party
who agreed to forthwith "complete the subdivision development" as a condition to exercising
purchase rights. See Appellant's Brief, at 26-29. Russell did not assume risks of unforeseen
delay and cannot be fairly expected to hold his property indefinitely until Coulter is able to
perform. Equity, instead, demands that Russell either be compensated fairly for losses
caused by Coulter's delay or that he be allowed to sell his property to another willing buyer.
It is now approaching five years since the Letter Agreement was signed and four
years since Spring of 1992 when Russell should have been paid for the lots. Coulter failed
to forthwith develop the Property and failed to even make appreciable progress by Spring
1992. The Russell Property remains as it was in April 1991 when the Letter Agreement was
signed, and Russell has realized no tangible benefit from any of Coulter's acts. Although
Coulter has sued Russell seeking specific performance of the Letter Agreement, it is clear
that Coulter has not timely fulfilled the conditions for exercise and tendered performance
as is required before bringing such a suit. See also Aspinwall v. Ryan, 190 Or. 530, 226 P.2d
814, 817 (1951) ("Before an optionee may bring suit for specific performance he must
clearly, explicitly, and unequivocally, within the time specified, communicate to the optionor
his acceptance of the offer contained in the option."). It is also clear that tender of such
performance is likely to be months or years in the future because Coulter has several major
obstacles to overcome before it can develop the Property as planned and promised.13 The

13

These include: (1) rezoning of all properties included in its planned single subdivision
to allow for building of 10,000 or 15,000 square-foot lots as originally contemplated, R. 6768, Annexation and Zoning Ordinance for the Russell Property, (2) resolving a lawsuit with
one Intervening Property owner, R. 304-13, Complaint and Answer in Coulter & Smith. Ltd.
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parties' did not agree or intend that Coulter's rights under the Letter Agreement would last
indefinitely. Rather, the whole tenor of the transaction, as supported by the documents and
affidavits submitted by the parties, was that the Letter Agreement was for the immediate
development, platting, and transfer of lots. Accordingly, this Court should determine that
these undisputed facts show Coulter's rights, if any, have lapsed.
IV.

ANY OFFER OR CONTRACT TO SELL LOTS CREATED BY THE LETTER
AGREEMENT HAS BEEN WITHDRAWN OR RESCINDED
An option without consideration is merely a continuing offer to sell at a certain price

that can be withdrawn at any time before acceptance. 77 Am. Jur. 2d Vendor & Purchaser
§ 34 (1975). Withdrawal of an offer may be express or implied by conduct that is
inconsistent with the offer. Restatement fSecond) of Contracts § 43. Coulter did not
dispute below, and does not dispute on appeal, this legal principle or the fact that Russell
unequivocally withdrew and revoked his offer to sell "lots" in November 1992 when he
informed Coulter of his intent to sell to the LDS Church. Rather, Coulter asserts that
Russell cannot withdraw his offer because it has given "ample consideration" in exchange for
its rights to purchase under the Agreement. Appellant's Brief, at 26-29.

v. Kemp, and (3) purchasing a parcel from another Intervening Property owner who has, as
yet, declined to sell. R. 320, Affidavit of Karen Hillstead Smith. Even if all preliminary
matters were resolved, actual development would take substantial efforts and significant time
to accomplish. See Sandy City Code of Ordinances, Subdivision Regulations § 15-34-1 et
seq. (Draft Feb. 6, 1996) (administrative, bonding, and construction requirements for
subdivision development). It is also questionable whether Coulter can even legally purchase
or develop any property as its authority to transact business in Utah was revoked at the time
it filed its Complaint. See R. 318, Certificate of Revocation.
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Coulter paid no money for its rights under the Letter Agreement. R. 70, Affidavit
of Roger Russell If 8. Notwithstanding, Coulter argues that Russell received consideration
for its option rights through its promise to complete the subdivision development.
Appellant's Brief, at 27-28. While Russell does not dispute that Coulter promised to
forthwith develop and subdivide the Russell Property as a necessary condition to purchasing
future lots, this promise is likely illusory and unenforceable by Russell and, thus, cannot
serve as consideration for Russell's grant of option rights. See Estate of Schmidt v. Downs,
775 P.2d 427, 431 (Utah App. 1989) ("an option is a unilateral obligation binding only on
the optionor"); Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706
P.2d 1028, 1036 (Utah 1985) ("For mutual promises of the parties to a bilateral contract to
constitute consideration for each other, the promises must be binding.").
Coulter next argues that since it has begun performance of the condition precedent
to exercise of rights in the Letter Agreement-namely, to subdivide the Russell Property-in
reliance on the Letter Agreement, that such performance is a substitute for consideration
and estops Russell from withdrawing his offer-presumably until Coulter is able to tender
performance through completion of subdivision development and payment. Appellant's
Brief, at 27-28. Coulter alleges that the same facts which show partial performance of the
Letter Agreement under the Statute of Frauds apply to this theory. However, for the same
reasons that Coulter's actions are insufficient to show partial performance, they are also
insufficient to support a theory of promissory estoppel. See Knight v. Seattle First Nat'l
Bank, 22 Wash. App. 493, 589 P.2d 1279,1282 (1979) (explaining that the part performance
by offeree sufficient to preclude withdrawal of an unilateral offer must be clearly referable
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to the offer, definite and substantial, and beneficial to the offeror and further that
,f

[b]eginning preparations though they may be essential to carrying out the contract or

accepting the offer, is not enough.").
Even if the Court were to determine that Coulter's part performance raised an issue
of material fact regarding whether Russell was estopped from withdrawing his offer, the
Court should still affirm the district court's summary judgment because Russell's withdrawal
could equally be considered a rescission of any enforceable contract. Although ignored in
its appellate brief, Coulter took great care to emphasize in its opposition papers that the
parties understood that Coulter would complete development of the subdivision "forthwith"
and with "due diligence." E.g., R. 227, Memorandum in Opposition to Summary Judgment.
Coulter has also submitted affidavit testimony explaining that the parties intended and
believed the lots would be developed and ready to purchase by Spring 1992. R. 219,
Affidavit of Nathan Coulter 11 12; R. 346, Supplemental Affidavit of Nathan Coulter II 14.
Notwithstanding Coulter's "substantial efforts" to develop the Property (which included no
physical work on the Property and no necessary, preliminary administrative work to allow
for subdivision plat approval) nothing had happened by Spring 1992-which was the time the
parties intended for all conditions to have been met and Russell paid. Assuming the Letter
Agreement was enforceable, Russell was justified and entitled to rescind it by virtue of
Coulter's failure to perform forthwith. See generally 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 583
(1991) ("It has been said, moreover, that in a transaction in which prompt action was
evidently contemplated by both parties, mutual delinquency gives rise to the presumption
of mutual assent to a rescission."); 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts § 584 (1991) ("[T]here is
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authority that a great delay in performance may be regarded as a ground for rescission even
though time is not of the essence and no notice to perform has been given."). In addition,
the fact that Coulter agreed to relinquish its rights under the Letter Agreement by agreeing
to trade the Coulter Property for the Russell Property shows that Coulter acknowledged and
accepted the fact that Russell withdrew his offer and rescinded any enforceable contract.
See R. 15-51, Real Property Exchange Agreement.
CONCLUSION
The Court should ensure that Russell suffers no further prejudice or delay through
the cloud that Coulter has inequitably demanded remain on Russell's property through this
lawsuit and appeal. There is no genuine issue as to any material fact necessary for this
Court to determine that the Letter Agreement is void and cannot be specifically enforced
by Coulter. Accordingly, Russell respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district
court's summary judgment in its favor.
DATED this

)Z> day of February 1996.
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH & DUNN

iael N. Zundel, Esq.
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Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees
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